We compared the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2x2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder were either individuals or groups of three players (who conducted face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We found that groups in the role of sender sent smaller amounts than individuals, and expected lower returns. In particular, groups sent nothing more often than individuals did (and were more likely to do so when the responder was another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder returned on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
Introduction
Trust is an essential ingredient of any successful society, be it as small as a family or as large as the European Union (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Bewley, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000) .
Trust is necessary because it allows members of the society to exchange favors, goods, and services, even though contracts to determine the quality or quantity of these transactions are essentially incomplete. Without mutual trust much of the exchange would not take place, to the detriment of the parties involved and the society at large (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001 ).
Obviously, trust plays an important role in any exchange relationship, whether the participants are individuals or groups. Yet, the experimental work on trust and trustworthiness has focused almost exclusively on individuals (see Camerer, 2003 , for a recent survey of the experimental literature on trust). Since many important transactions take place between groups (governments, firms, bargaining committees, families), and since trust between two groups, or between a group and an individual, cannot be readily inferred from individual-level experiments (e.g., Davis, 1992; Kerr, MacCoun and Cramer, 1996) , studying group behavior in the laboratory is indispensable. The aim of the present paper is to explore potential differences between groups and individuals in trusting and trustworthy behavior. Establishing the existence of such differences would have important implications for market transactions, bargaining in economic and political settings, and the institutional organization of companies.
As our research tool we used a slightly modified version of the trust game, originally introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) . There are two players in this game: a sender and a responder. The sender receives an initial endowment, X > 0, and can send any amount x to the responder, with 0 ≤ x ≤ X. The responder gets triple the amount sent (3x) and can return to the sender any amount y, with 0 ≤ y ≤ 3x. The final payoff for the sender is X -x + y, and for the responder 3x -y.
The amount x is traditionally used as a measure for the sender's trust in an anonymous interaction partner. The relative return y/3x is taken as an indicator of the responder's trustworthiness. In the present setting, trust is the willingness to transfer a positive amount (x > 0) to the other person in the hope that this person will reciprocate at her own cost. This measure captures a widespread definition of trust: the deliberate willingness of an agent to make himself vulnerable to the actions of another agent (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, 1998) .
If one assumes that the players have no benevolent other-regarding preferences (and that this is common knowledge), then the standard game-theoretic solution of the trust game prescribes that: (i) the responder will keep all of any tripled amounts transferred by the sender and, (ii) knowing this, the sender will not transfer any positive amount. This "completely selfish" (sub-game perfect) equilibrium is, of course, collectively inefficient, because it precludes the possible efficiency gains generated by trust.
However, the results of trust game experiments are clearly inconsistent with the prescription of the standard model. Berg et al. (1995) report that, with x=$10, the average amount transferred by senders was $5.16 and the average amount returned by responders was $4.66.
1 Subsequent studies have reported similar figures (see Camerer, 2003) . However, all these studies were limited to individual decisions. The only exception is a recent study by Cox (2002) , who compared trust games played between two individuals with the same games played between two groups (of three individuals each). His main findings are that individuals and groups do not differ in the amount x sent, but groups in the role of responders return significantly smaller amounts y.
Our paper extends the work by Cox (2002) in two ways: First, and most importantly, we studied not only the symmetric games where both players are either individuals or groups, but also the asymmetric cases where a group plays against an individual and vice versa. Employing a complete 2x2 design where both sender and responder can be either an individual or a group, may help distinguish between effects that depend on the type of the decision maker and effects that depend on the decisionmaker's expectations about the opponent's behavior.
Second, while Cox's experiment employed a within-subjects design where the same participants played the trust game first as individuals and then as members of a group, in our experiment each participant played the game only once, as either an individual decision-maker or a group member. This between-subjects design eliminates potential carry-over effects between the two conditions. In particular, it obviates the possibility that the individual decisions may serve as anchors for the later group decision, thereby blurring the existence of genuine differences between groups and individuals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental design and procedure. Section 3 reports the experimental results, and section 4 concludes.
Experimental procedure
Subjects and design: The participants were 426 undergraduate students at the Procedure: All the participants in a session gathered in a lecture room, where they received written instructions. After reading the instructions aloud, the experimenters answered questions privately. Then the participants were randomly assigned their roles by drawing an envelope. Each group was escorted to a separate room and group members were free to discuss any issue without being monitored. The experimenters distributed and collected decision sheets and questionnaires. Individuals stayed in the lecture room separated from one another by sliding walls.
The instructions were phrased in neutral terms. 2 Participants were not instructed to maximize their earnings and no references to any specific strategies were made.
Participants were told in advance that their decisions and their eventual payment would remain confidential. They were also assured that the game was played only once and that the experiment involved no deception.
Senders received an initial endowment (X) of 100 units of money. 3 Responders received no endowment. Final payoffs were determined by X -x + y for the sender and for the responder. For groups in either role these amounts were the payoffs for each group member. Groups were allowed free face-to-face communication and were instructed to decide on a single transfer in either role.
Decision-makers in the sender role wrote their decisions on forms which were put in sealed envelopes before being collected by the experimenters. Group senders had 15 minutes to decide on a common transfer. 4 The envelopes were then transferred to the responders in a predetermined manner that was not obvious to the participants. While responders decided on the transfer, senders filled in a questionnaire, in which they were asked about their prediction of the amount the responder would send back. 5 Participants were told that they would be rewarded for accurate predictions. 6 The responders' decision forms were shown to the corresponding senders. Before the subjects were paid, 2 See the experimental instructions in the Appendix. 3 Throughout the experiment we used endowments of 100 money units (worth 7.3€ or 100 Austrian Schillings before the Euro was introduced). 4 The time limit was not strictly enforced, though. Three groups had not reached a decision after 15 minutes. They were given five additional minutes, after which all of them had reached a consensus.
5 Responders were not asked to state any predictions for the sender's transfer x, to avoid contamination of behavior. 6 We asked for the proportion of the tripled amount (3x) that subjects predicted they would get back from the responder. We paid for the accuracy of predictions by using the following payoff role:
, where r e denotes the predicted return and r t the actual return in percent of 3x. The payoff for predictions was explained in detail and introduced only after decisions about x had been collected by the experimenters. privately and in cash 7 , the participants were debriefed on the rationale and purpose of the experiment. Sessions that involved group players lasted approximately one hour, while sessions with individuals lasted only about 40 minutes. x is divided into 4 categories: nothing (x=0), up to half (0<x≤50), more than half 7 In addition to payoffs from the trust game, we paid each participant a show-up fee of 2 €.
Experimental results

Sender behavior
(50<x<100) and the entire amount (x=100). For each of these categories we performed a set of planned comparisons, testing first for differences between individual and group senders, and then for differences within each type of sender, depending on the type of responder. This analysis reveals that groups sent nothing (x=0) more often than individuals (t (105) =1.67, p<0.049, one-tailed test). Moreover, groups sent nothing more often to another group than to an individual responder (t (105) =2.02, p<0.046, two-tailed test). Individual senders, on the other hand, were equally likely to send nothing to a group and to another individual (t (105)= 0.63, n.s.). Individuals and groups were equally likely to send the whole amount, and both types of senders were as likely to send x=100 to a group as to an individual responder. However, individual senders were more likely to send more than half of the endowment (50<x<100) than group senders (t (105) =2.9, p<0.004). Table 2 reports the mean percent of return y out of 3x. The data were analyzed in a 2(responder) × 2(sender) ANOVA. Neither the two main effects nor the interaction effect were statistically significant.
<Insert Figure 1 Here>
Responder behavior
Overall, the higher the amount sent, the higher the rate of return (this obviously means that the absolute returns are higher too). When the sender transfers the whole amount (x=100), responders return an average of 33.51% (of 300). This rate is significantly higher than the 17.63% which was the average return when the amount sent was over 50, but less than 100 (t(93)=5.06, p < 0.001), which in turn is significantly higher than the rate of return for low amounts (x<50), which was only 9.12%. This means that senders who transferred the whole endowment did not, on average, lose money, although they did not profit either. Senders who sent less than 100 on average lost money as a result of this transaction. Sending less than the full amount (i.e. showing 'partial' trust) seems to be perceived rather as a signal of mistrust than of trust, which is not generally rewarded. The senders' full trust (with x=100) is on average compensated by responders' returning roughly one third of the tripled amount. <Insert Table 2 Here> Table 3 presents the mean predicted return (in percent of the amount sent).
Predictions
Comparing the actual return with the predicted return (compare Tables 2 and 3) reveals that the actual return is lower than that predicted in all treatments (p<0.01 for each of the cells, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
<Insert Table 3 Here> Individuals generally predicted higher returns than groups (F(1,91)=4.8, p<0.05).
But both types of senders predicted similar returns from individual and group responders (F(1,90)=0.79, n.s., for main effect of responder; and F(1,90)=0.46, n.s., for the interaction). Thus, senders did not have different predictions when the responder was an individual or a group. 8 The same pattern has been found by Pillutla, Malhorta and Murnighan (2003) for individuals. Our Next we look at the difference between the senders' and the responders' payoffs, which is also listed in Table 4 . Responders earned more than senders in all conditions.
Payoffs and efficiency
The size of the responder advantage was significantly affected by the type of sender.
When the sender was an individual, the responders' advantage was larger than when the sender was a group (F(1,105)=7.04, p <0.01). The effects of the type of the responder and the sender/responder interaction were not statistically significant.
<Insert whether individual or group decision makers condition their behavior on whether the type of their bargaining partner is an individual or a group.
Previous research suggests that there could be differences between individual and group decisions. For example, research on the two-person prisoner's dilemma game (Insko and Schopler, 1987; Schopler and Insko, 1992) has documented a consistent tendency of groups to play this game more competitively than individuals. Insko and Schopler offer two explanations for this observed difference, termed the "discontinuity" effect. 9 The "social support for shared self-interest" hypothesis argues that groups are more selfish than individuals because group members provide each other with support for acting in a selfish, ingroup-oriented way, support which individual players do not have.
Given the logic of backward induction inherent in the theoretical (sub-game perfect) solution of the trust game, the "social support for shared self-interest"
hypothesis should be applied first to the behavior of the group in the responder role. If group members have social support for acting selfishly, groups should send back smaller amounts than individuals. Cox (2002) indeed found this to be the case.
Receiving about the same amount x, group respondents in his experiment returned significantly lower amounts y than individuals. The present study, on the other hand, failed to detect significant differences between individual and group responders in the relative size of returns.
Next we direct our attention to the beliefs and resulting behavior of individuals and groups in the sender role. Specifically, we ask whether groups more likely than individuals to assume that the responders are selfish and therefore should not be trusted.
Insko and Schopler's answer to this question is a definite "yes". Their "schema-based distrust" hypothesis postulates that groups are more competitive than individuals in playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game because they are more likely to expect their opponent to act competitively and want to defend themselves against the possibility of being exploited. Nevertheless, Cox's experiment failed to replicate this difference in the trust game. Groups in his experiment sent out the same amount x as individuals, even though they ended up receiving less back (from group responders). Again, our experiment yields a different result. We find that groups in the role of the sender are generally less trusting than individuals. Groups expect significantly lower relative returns than individuals, and consequently transfer significantly smaller amounts to both individual and group responders.
10
The present experiment, unlike that of Cox, also studied the asymmetric cases where groups and individuals play against each other as either senders and responders.
Thus, in addition to testing whether groups are generally less trusting and/or trustworthy than individuals, our design enables us to detect whether the greater selfishness of groups (as compared with individuals) is "common knowledge". In particular, we could test whether groups trust other groups less than they trust individuals. Unfortunately, our results fall short of providing a definitive answer to this question. On the one hand, the average amount sent in the G-G condition was not significantly different from that consistent with the explanations provided in the text, i.e. the "social support for shared self-interest" hypothesis and the "schema-based distrust" hypothesis. 10 Recall that we asked for predictions of relative returns (= y/3x), not absolute returns (= y). Given that group senders transfer lower amounts x it would have been no surprise if they predicted lower absolute returns. However, our results show that they also predict significantly lower relative returns than individuals do.
in the G-I condition. On the other hand, groups sent nothing (x=0) to group responders significantly more often than they did to individual responders.
Pairing an individual with a group raises efficiency considerations that are absent in the symmetric cases. To the extent that collective efficiency is a concern, individuals and groups senders are expected to send higher amounts x to a group responder than to an individual responder. Whereas each unit sent to an individual is multiplied by three, each unit transferred to group is multiplied by nine. For similar reasons, both individuals and groups responders should send back a smaller amount y to an individual than to a group sender. In particular, groups should send back less to an individual than to another group, since each unit sent back costs the group three units (one for each group member), while the benefit to the individual recipient is only one unit.
Obviously, neither group nor individual behavior (of either senders or responders) is consistent with these predictions.
To summarize, we found that groups in the role of sender are generally less trusting than individuals, but there is no difference in relative returns between group and individual responders. This finding is different from that of Cox, who found differences between individual and group respondents, but not between individual and group senders. Obviously, more experimental work is needed in order to establish the precise differences between individuals and groups.
What can already be concluded at this point is that groups are not any more trusting or trustworthy than individuals. This rather weak conclusion is nevertheless valuable, since it is consistent (or at least not inconsistent) with what we already know about group versus individual bargaining. Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) , who compared bargaining behavior of individuals and groups in a standard one-shot ultimatum game, found that groups demand more than individuals but are willing to accept less. Kocher and Sutter (2002) showed that, in a one-shot gift exchange game, where party A can determine a 'wage' for party B, and party B can reciprocate by choosing a level of effort (greater effort is more beneficial for A, but has higher costs for B), groups chose the smallest possible wage and effort, respectively. Bornstein, Kugler and Ziegelmeyer (2004) found that groups terminate the increasing-sum centipede game earlier than individuals, meaning that group decisions are guided by a concern for payoffmaximization more than individual decisions. In sum, the experimental literature on bargaining games with face-to-face communication among group members seems to support the existence of the "discontinuity" effect detected by Insko & Schopler in the PD game.
11 From the viewpoint of the larger society the behavior of groups is clearly problematic, since it entails large efficiency costs. 11 The only experiment that suggests otherwise is a study by Cason and Mui (1997) who found that groups made more other-regarding allocations than individuals in a dictator game, where one decision maker can divide an amount x between himself and a powerless recipient. However, Kocher, Luhan and Sutter (2004) were unable to replicate the finding of Cason and Mui (1997) . Rather, Kocher et al. (2004) found that groups are significantly more selfish in the dictator game than individuals. Hence, it seems that the evidence of the dictator game is inconclusive and not completely inconsistent with most of the literature that indicates that groups are more selfish and competitive than individuals.
Appendix: Experimental instructions (for the G-G treatment; translated from
German)
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. During the experiment you will be asked to make a decision, and so will the other participants. Your own decision, as well as the decisions of the others, will determine your monetary payoff according to rules that will be explained shortly.
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment exactly according to the rules.
Please keep quiet throughout the entire experiment and do not communicate in any way with the other participants!!!
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will approach you and answer your questions privately.
In this session, 42 people are participating in the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants will be divided randomly into 14 groups of 3 each. Each of these groups will be paired with another group throughout the experiment. In each such pair, one group will be assigned the role A and the other group the role B. This assignment to roles will be done randomly. You have no way of knowing who you are paired with or the roles of the other participants.
At the beginning of the experiment group A will receive 100 Austrian Schilling (ATS).
Group B will not receive any money. A will have to decide how much of the 100 ATS to send to B. A can send any amount X between 0 ATS and 100 ATS to group B. A will keep the amount not sent (100-X), while the amount sent to B will be tripled. That is, for the X ATS sent by A, B will receive 3X ATS. Now it is group B's turn to make a decision. B has to decide how much of the amount received from A to send back. Again, B can send back to A any amount Y between 0 ATS and 3X ATS (Note: this amount will not be tripled!). B will keep the amount not sent back to A (3X-Y).
At the end of the experiment both groups will be paid in cash. Each of the members of group A will receive the amount they kept out of the original 100 ATS (100-X), plus the amount sent back to them by B (Y). Each of the members of group B will receive triple the amount sent to them by A (3X) minus the amount sent back to A (Y).
You will now be asked to choose an envelope at random. Inside the envelope you will find a subject number. Your group number and role (A or B) will be printed on the card on which you see your subject number. Please keep the subject number until the end of the experiment. You will need it to receive your payment.
After all the participants have opened the envelopes, participants will be guided to rooms, where they can discuss their decision. Please keep quiet while waiting or moving to the other rooms.
Decision of group A:
(1) Only when asked, open the decision envelope you receive from the experimenter. Inside you will find a decision form. You have up to 15 minutes to discuss your decision.
(2) Please read the decision form carefully. Raise your hand if you have any questions.
(3) After the decision is made, fill in your group number and the amount you decide to send to group B.
(4) Place the completed form inside the white decision envelope and seal it. The experimenter will come to collect the envelope.
(5) The envelope containing your form will be delivered to the corresponding group B, and you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire.
Decision of group B:
(6) When you receive the decision envelope from group A, open it. Inside you will find a decision form with the amount sent to you by A. Remember that the amount you receive has been tripled, that is, if A sent you X ATS, you actually receive 3X ATS. (9) After filling out the form, place it back inside your decision envelope, together with the envelope and decision form sent to you by A. Seal it and give it back to the experimenter.
(10) When all participants finish filling out the forms, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire.
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment exactly according to the rules. You will receive your payoff in a sealed envelope. The other group will have no way of knowing your identity and neither will any of the other participants. In addition, the experimental results are recorded in a such way that none of the experimenters will be able to associate your identity with your decisions and payoffs. The experiment is played only once. Please consider your decisions carefully. 
